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The primary goal of the Duke Law Journal’s Symposium on 
Evaluating Judging, Judges, and Judicial Institutions was to bring 
together judges and academics researching judges. Conversations 
between these groups can be constructive on both sides. Judges may 
benefit from learning about studies that show the influences on judicial 
performance or that demonstrate which reforms can improve the 
quality of judging. Academics may benefit by discovering new ideas 
that have not yet been researched or by understanding how judging in 
the real world compares with their view of judging. 
Some of the discussions at the Symposium highlighted an area 
where academics’ perceptions of judging conflict with judges’ actual 
experiences. Judges and academics view the significance of judicial 
dissents quite differently. Whereas many of the judges believe that 
dissents primarily reflect the level of cohesiveness and collegiality of 
the court, academics typically place much more significance on the 
meaning of judicial dissents. For example, recent academic studies 
have asserted that judicial dissents often reveal the influence of judges’ 
retention concerns,1 the level of judges’ independence,2 or certain 
judges’ higher propensity for risk taking.3 
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In contrast, many judges at the Symposium considered academics’ 
emphasis on judicial dissents to be misguided. The judges maintained 
that dissents reveal less about judges’ retention concerns, impartiality, 
or risk preferences, and more about the culture of collegiality on the 
court. Many of the judges believe that dissents primarily reflect the 
level of cohesiveness among judges, and that various factors and 
institutions influence this cohesiveness. For example, they explained 
that the personal relationships, amount of professional and social 
interaction, and diversity among judges on a court might influence the 
level of dissent. Many of the judges hypothesized that courts that are 
more collegial, either because the judges are better friends or share 
more common values or backgrounds, should have lower dissent rates. 
Judges on these courts should be less likely to openly criticize the 
opinions of their colleagues by dissenting. 
Although academics have long recognized that institutions such as 
opinion-assignment procedures and voting order might influence the 
propensity to dissent,4 empirical studies have failed to consider the 
impact of collegiality and personal relationships on dissent rates. Thus, 
in this short Essay, I empirically test whether some of the judges’ 
assertions are consistent with the data. I test whether various measures 
of diversity are associated with dissent rates in state supreme courts. I 
find that diversity in many areas—gender, race, age, religion, home 
state, and political affiliation—is associated with higher levels of 
dissent. In contrast, diversity in the jobs that judges had before taking 
the bench is associated with lower dissent rates.5 
I also test whether the length of time judges have served on the 
court is associated with dissent rates. Presumably, judges that have 
served on a court together for many years would have stronger 
friendships than newer judges, and thus may be more collegial and less 
likely to dissent. However, my empirical analysis finds the opposite: the 
greater the number of judges with lengthy tenures on the court, the 
higher the dissent rate. 
 
 4. Melinda Gann Hall, Docket Control as an Influence on Judicial Voting, 10 JUST. SYS. J. 
243, 243 (1985). 
 5. A recent study has explored the relationship between political, gender, and racial 
diversity on opinion publication practices. Although the study finds that gender and racial 
diversity have little impact on publication rates, it finds that political diversity among circuit court 
judges decreases the number of district court judges’ opinion publications, while increasing the 
length of those publications. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal 
District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals 23–25 (Univ. of Chi. 
Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 508, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1536723. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
To test the influence of diversity and tenure on judges’ propensity 
to dissent, I use data from the State Supreme Court Data Archive. This 
data includes an almost universal sample of state supreme court cases 
in all fifty states from 1995 to 1998. The data include more than twenty-
eight thousand decisions involving more than 470 individual state 
supreme court justices.6 The data include variables that reflect case 
histories, case participants, legal issues, case outcomes, and individual 
justices’ behavior. I supplemented these data with institutional 
variables that describe aspects of each state’s judicial system, and with 
detailed information about each judge’s personal characteristics, 
background, and career. 
Thus, my data consist of individual judge-level votes in each case 
before the state supreme courts. I use an ordinary probit model to test 
whether diversity and tenure on a court influence judges’ likelihood of 
dissenting. The dependent variable in my estimation is an indicator 
variable for whether an individual judge casts a dissenting vote in each 
case. 
My estimation includes several measures of the diversity of judges’ 
personal characteristics and backgrounds on each court. I measure the 
diversity of each personal characteristic on each court with an index 
that is essentially one minus a Herfindahl index of each characteristic:7 
Diversity of personal characteristic = 1 – xj (# of judges of each type j / 
total # of judges)2. 
For example, diversity along the racial dimension would be measured 
with: 
Diversity of race = 1 − xj (# of judges of each race j / total # of judges)2, 
where j = [White, African American, Asian, Hispanic, and other]. 
The diversity measure ranges from zero, when the court is composed 
of judges of only one “type” (that is, race), to one, when each type is 
represented equally on the court. Thus, increases in this measure 
indicate an increase in diversity on the court.8 
 
 6. State dockets exceeding two hundred cases in a single year are selected from a random 
sample of two hundred cases. Typically, case quantities are unaffected due to the limited size of 
many state supreme court dockets. 
 7. Albert O. Hirschman, The Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 761, 761 (1964). 
 8. This diversity index is the standard measure of diversity used by both the U.S. Census 
Bureau and other studies on diversity. Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir & William Easterly, Public 
Goods and Ethnic Divisions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1243, 1254 (1999). 
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I include variables that measure diversity along several different 
dimensions: gender, race (White, African American, Asian, Hispanic, 
and other), age (under 45, 46 to 55, 56 to 65, and over 65), religion 
(Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Mormon, and other), 
home state (from the state where the court is located or from another 
state), political party affiliation (Republican, Democrat, or 
Independent), and job held before taking the bench (prosecutor, 
attorney general, elected official, lower-court judge, or nonelected 
official). 
I also include two variables that represent judges’ tenure on the 
court. I include the percentage of judges on each court that have served 
for one year or less; presumably, these judges have not served long 
enough to develop strong personal relationships with other judges. I 
also include the percentage of judges on each court that have served 
for six years or more; if these judges have developed stronger 
friendships, they may be more collegial and less likely to dissent. 
In addition to the diversity and tenure variables, the estimations 
include a series of judge-level, case-level, and state-level variables that 
might be related to judges’ propensity to cast dissenting votes. The 
judge-level variables include an indicator for whether a particular 
judge is the chief justice on the court, and a variable indicating the 
number of years until the judge’s next retention.9 These variables 
control for voting changes throughout a judge’s career and term. 
All estimations also include various case-level variables that may 
be related to dissenting votes. First, I include indicator variables for 
whether a case is a criminal case, a juvenile case, a civil case involving 
the state government, or a civil case involving private individuals. Thus, 
the base category is nonadversarial cases, such as cases involving 
certification and advisory opinions. Finally, I include indicator 
variables for whether at least one litigant is a business, a person, or a 
representative of the state government.  These indicator variables 
control for any relationship between dissent rates and the litigants or 
legal issues in a case. 
Next, I include various state-level characteristics that have been 
found to be related to dissenting votes. First, I include an indicator 
variable for whether judges in the state face reelection by the voters. 
In a previous study, I found empirical results suggesting that judges’ 
 
 9. This variable is actually the reverse of the years to retention. Because the longest number 
of years to retention during my sample is twelve, the inverse years to retention is thirteen minus 
the years to retention. 
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reelection concerns are important influences on their propensity to cast 
dissenting votes.10 
I also include a variable that indicates whether the state has a 
lower appellate court, and thus, whether the court has discretionary 
review to hear cases. Numerous studies report that the presence of an 
intermediate appellate court increases dissent rates, suggesting that 
discretionary dockets facilitate the expression of dissent.11 
The state-level variables also include indicator variables for 
whether a court utilizes a random opinion-assignment procedure 
instead of a discretionary procedure, and whether voting takes place in 
the order of seniority. Random or rotating opinion-assignment 
procedures prevent judges from being rewarded or sanctioned for their 
opposition votes, and thus reduce the incentives for consensus.12 In 
contrast, when opinions are assigned by the chief justice, opportunities 
for rewards and sanctions emerge. Similarly, when voting takes place 
in order of seniority, the most senior judges may influence junior 
judges, reducing the likelihood of their disagreement.13  
Moreover, all estimations include year indicators to capture trends 
in the likelihood of dissent. In the probit estimations, the t-statistics are 
computed from standard errors clustered by case. 
Table 1 reports the primary probit results. In this table, the top 
number in each cell is the regression coefficient, which indicates the 
magnitude and direction of the relationship of each variable with 
judges’ votes. A negative coefficient indicates that a variable reduces 
the probability that a judge will cast a dissenting vote; a positive 
coefficient indicates that a variable increases the probability that a 
judge will dissent. Under each coefficient is the corresponding t-
statistic. Coefficients with t-statistics equal to or greater than 1.96 are 
considered statistically significant at the 5 percent level, meaning that 
there is 95 percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. 
A t-statistic equal to or greater than 1.96 is typically required to draw 
conclusions in hypothesis testing. 
 
 10. Shepherd, supra note 1, at 105. 
 11. H. Glick & G. Pruet, Jr., Dissent in State Supreme Courts: Patterns and Correlates of 
Conflict, in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN 
APPELLATE COURTS 199, 200 (Sheldon Goldman & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1986); Hall & Brace, 
supra note 3, at 398. 
 12. Hall, supra note 4, at 250. 
 13. See Hall & Brace, supra note 3, at 397. 
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The results indicate that diversity among the judges hearing a case 
is significantly related to the propensity to dissent. The positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the diversity variables for 
gender, race, age, religion, home state, and political affiliation indicate 
that diversity along these dimensions is associated with higher levels of 
dissent. These results are consistent with the Symposium judges’ belief 
that dissent reflects lack of cohesiveness on a court; greater diversity 
probably implies that the judges have fewer common values and 
experiences, reducing the incentives for collegiality. 
In contrast, diversity in the jobs that judges held before taking the 
bench is negatively associated with dissent. This suggests that more 
diversity in professional backgrounds is associated with a reduction in 
the propensity to dissent. Thus, different backgrounds, at least in terms 
of the judges’ professional lives, do not appear to reduce collegiality on 
a court. 
Moreover, the results indicate that the more judges with very short 
tenure on the court (one year or less), the less likely judges are to 
dissent. Similarly, the more judges with lengthy tenures on the court 
(six years or more), the more likely judges are to dissent. If lengthy 
tenure is a good proxy for strong personal relationships among judges, 
then these results are inconsistent with the experiences of some of the 
judges participating in the Symposium. Instead of lengthy tenures 
reducing the propensity to dissent because judges are better friends, 
my results indicate that lengthy tenures increase the propensity to 
dissent. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with studies that assert 
that junior judges feel pressure to not dissent against more experienced 
senior judges.14 Thus, even if judges build stronger personal 
relationships during their time on the court, their inclinations to agree 
with friends may be outweighed by the confidence and experience that 
comes with longer tenure on the court. 
Several other variables also have statistically significant 
relationships with the propensity to dissent. Judicial elections, 
discretionary dockets, random opinion assignment, and seniority 
voting are associated with increases in dissent rates. In contrast, an 
approaching retention and chief justice status appear to reduce the 
propensity to dissent. 
 
 14. This “freshman effect”—the lower likelihood of junior judges to dissent—has been found 
in Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Acclimation Effects and 
Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 802 (2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
In this short Essay, I tested whether the empirical evidence is 
consistent with the experiences of some of the judges participating in 
the Duke Law Journal’s Symposium on Evaluating Judging, Judges, 
and Judicial Institutions. Although my results confirmed that 
institutional and political factors are important influences on dissent 
rates, I also found that the levels of cohesiveness and collegiality 
among judges are important. These results indicate that academic 
studies of judging can greatly benefit if academics consider the real-
world experiences of judges. 
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           Table 1 
 
Notes: The table reports coefficients from a probit model. For 
brevity, the indicator variables for years, case types, and litigant types 
are not reported here. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. An 
asterisk represents significance at the 5 percent level. 
Variable 
Likelihood of  
Dissenting Vote 
Judge Faces Reelection  
0.54* 
(15.92) 
Years to Retention (reverse) 
-0.014* 
(5.25) 
Chief Justice  
-0.13* 
(6.13) 
Lower Appellate Court  
0.078* 
(3.09) 
Random Opinion Assignment 
0.127* 
(6.13) 
Seniority Voting 
0.067* 
(2.97) 
Diversity in Age 
0.353* 
(4.83) 
Diversity in Gender 
0.403* 
(6.03) 
Diversity in Race 
0.236* 
(4.0) 
Diversity in Religion 
0.158* 
(4.1) 
Diversity in Political Party 
0.184* 
(5.26) 
Diversity in Previous Job 
-0.293* 
(10.74) 
Percentage of Judges on the Court 
for One Year or Less 
-0.293* 
(2.26) 
Percentage of Judges on the Court 
for Six Years or More 
0.314* 
(5.67) 
Number of Observations 84178 
Log Likelihood -19318 
